FEW THINGS ARE CERTAIN IN LIFE, EVEN
LESS ARE CERTAIN IN DEATH AND
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The United States Courts’ website provides numerous laudatory
reasons for why a consumer debtor would decide to pursue debt
adjustment through a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy filing.1 Mainly:
Chapter 13 offers individuals a number of
advantages over liquidation under chapter
7. Perhaps most significantly, chapter 13
offers individuals an opportunity to save
their homes from foreclosure. By filing
under this chapter, individuals can stop
foreclosure proceedings and may cure
delinquent mortgage payments over time.
Nevertheless, they must still make all
mortgage payments that come due during
the chapter 13 plan on time. Another
advantage of chapter 13 is that it allows
individuals to reschedule secured debts
(other than a mortgage for their primary
residence) and extend them over the life
of the chapter 13 plan. Doing this may
lower the payments. Chapter 13 also has
a special provision that protects third
parties who are liable with the debtor on
“consumer debts.” This provision may
protect co-signors. Finally, chapter 13
acts like a consolidation loan under which
the individual makes the plan payments
to a chapter 13 trustee who then
distributes payments to creditors.
A graduate of the University of Tennessee College of Law, John Edward Pevy is an
associate attorney with the law firm of Milligan & Coleman, PLLP, in Greeneville,
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Chapter 13 – Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/servicesforms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-13-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Jan.
23, 2016).
1

309

310 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 17

Individuals will have no direct contact
with creditors while under chapter 13
protection.2
As a result of many of these reasons, hundreds of thousands of
United States citizens aspire to complete a chapter 13 bankruptcy plan
each year.3 In fact, of the 936,795 bankruptcy filings in 2014, roughly
one-third were chapter 13 filings. 4 Despite this large number, a
staggering percentage of chapter 13 filers do not complete their plan
payments or receive the discharge of debts – or the “fresh start,” as
many bankruptcy proponents deem it – that the debtors sought through
the mechanisms of the United States bankruptcy system. 5 Based on
recent data provided by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act Report, of the roughly 300,000 cases filed,
courts dismissed over 90,000 for failure to make plan payments.6 In fact,
various sources report that of all the chapter 13 bankruptcies filed, a
staggering seventy-five percent (75%) never reach their end goal. 7
However, failure to make plan payments is not the only reason that
bankruptcy courts dismiss debtors’ chapter 13 plans. 8 Death of a
2

Id.

Table F-2. U.S. Bankruptcy Courts–Business and Nonbusiness Cases Commenced By the
Bankruptcy Code, During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2014, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/f-2/bankruptcy-filings/2014/12/31
(last
visited Jan. 23, 2016).
3

Id. Even further, of the 310,061 chapter 13 bankruptcies filed in 2014, only 2,278 of
those chapter 13 plans were undertaken by businesses. The remaining 307,783 chapter
13 cases filed and plans initiated were by individual or joint consumer debtors. Id.
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Chapter 13 Repayment Plans, NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMMISSION,
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/08consum.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2016)
(stating that Chapter 13 could be improved, and, in particular, that “[t]he high noncompletion rate of Chapter 13 plans is cause for substantial concern”).
5

BAPCPA Table 6. U.S. Bankruptcy Courts–Chapter 13 Individual Debtor Cases With
Predominately Nonbusiness Debts Closed by Dismissal or Plan Completion During The 12-Month
Period ending December 31, 2013, as Required by 28 U.S.C 159(c), U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/bapcpa-6/bankruptcy-abuse-preventionand-consumer-protection-act-bapcpa/2013/12/31 (last visited Jan. 24, 2016).
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Scott F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy’s New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and
Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415, 440-41 (1999) (stating that
in an empirical study of 71 chapter 13 filers, “[a]pproximately 32% (23 of 71) of the
chapter 13 debtors in the study sample successfully completed a plan and received a
discharge.”); NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMMISSION, supra note 5; John Skiba, When
Bankruptcy Goes Bad: Why Chapter 13’s Fail, SKIBA L. GROUP, PLC (Aug. 3, 2012),
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While this paper will only deal explicitly with one reason for chapter 13 plan failures,
there are a multitude of reasons why a chapter 13 plan may not reach completion, such
as conversion to chapter 7 liquidation. See Alane A. Becket & William A. McNeal,
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chapter 13 debtor can lead to a number of dispositions by the court – at
the urging of the Trustee – and the resulting impact on co-debtors, the
debtors’ estate, and creditors, can likewise vary widely.
The vast disparity in court dispositions – despite cases with
similar facts – owes itself in part to statutory drafting.9 Titled “Death or
Incompetency of Debtor,” Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure Rule
1016 states:
Death or incompetency of the debtor
shall not abate a liquidation case under
chapter 7 of the Code. In such event the
estate shall be administered and the case
concluded in the same manner, so far as
possible, as though the death or
incompetency had not occurred. If a
reorganization, family farmer’s debt
adjustment,
or
individual’s
debt
adjustment case is pending under chapter
11, chapter 12, or chapter 13, the case
may be dismissed; or if further
administration is possible and in the best
interest of the parties, the case may
proceed and be concluded in the same
manner, so far as possible, as though the
death or incompetency had not
occurred.10
Use of the term “may” as a directive for the courts throughout
the statute creates just enough discretionary leeway for courts to
exploit. 11 Often times, courts do not determine that “further
administration” is either possible or in the best interest of the parties.12
This decision by the courts can provide a stark glimpse into the prodebtor or pro-creditor leanings of the courts themselves. One court
even went so far as to characterize the problem by stating that “[i]n the
absence of clear and direct guidance, case law addressing deceased
Contrary Conversion Conclusions: Circuits Split on Who Gets Funds on Hand, 33 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 16 (2014).
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See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1016 (1991).
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chapter 13 debtors developed irregularly.” 13 Such a wide swathe of
holdings on the part of the bankruptcy courts, ranging from dismissal of
the case all the way to complete discharge of the debts, should be
regulated in a more structured manner. This paper examines the
discordant adjudications laid down by bankruptcy courts in the event
that a chapter 13 debtor dies during the pendency of his plan and
proposes that further questions be examined to determine a possible
solution.
I. Dismissal

While somewhat draconian, the statute certainly provides
dismissal as an option for courts following the death of a chapter 13
debtor. 14 For instance, courts repeatedly dismiss cases involving the
deaths of solitary chapter 13 debtors. 15 The court in, In re Hennessy,
determined that dismissal was the appropriate disposition because “a
Chapter 13 debtor who dies does not need a fresh start,” and thereby the
probate proceeds of the former debtor’s estate should serve to repay
creditors.16 Perceived inequity on the part of the court’s ruling does not
dissuade some courts from dismissing chapter 13 cases as well. For
example, In re Fogel, where the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Colorado determined whether a widow should be granted a discharge of
her husband’s debts, after he had died, and she had completed plan
payments while serving as the personal representative of the debtor’s
estate. 17 The court denied the debtor’s widow the right to discharge
from the debts, stating instead that “if one of two debtors in a joint
Chapter 13 case dies, it is conceivable that the surviving debtor could
continue making the payments under the confirmed plan and achieve the
benefits of the bankruptcy case that debtor filed, thus avoiding dismissal
of the case,” 18 However, “[t]he nondebtor spouse cannot simply make
the payments under the plan and achieve the benefits of the stay and the
discharge without filing a case.”19

In re Levy, No. 11-60130, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1229, at *1, *9 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
Mar. 31, 2014).
13

14

Id. at *10.

See In re Fogel, 507 B.R. 734, 735 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2014); In re Hennessy, No. 1113793, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3034, at *1, *4 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 29, 2013).
15
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In re Hennessy, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3034at *4.
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In re Fogel, 507 B.R. 734-35.
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Id. at 735.
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Dismissal in the case of joint chapter 13 debtors, while
presenting a more complicated situation for the courts, sometimes yields
a similar result when both debtors pass away. For example, in In re
Spiser, following the death of both debtors post-petition, the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas first vacated
a proposal from the United States Trustee to convert the case from a
chapter 13 bankruptcy to a chapter 7 bankruptcy and then granted the
Trustee’s motion for a dismissal because the debtors were no longer able
to complete their chapter 13 plan payments.20 The reasoning applied to
allow this dismissal remains sound. Because both debtors had passed
away, there was no “person,” as defined in United State Code Annotated
title 11, § 109, who could even serve as the debtor in a chapter 7 case.21
Accordingly, the court stated that “[t]he term ‘person’ is defined in §
101(41) to include ‘individual, partnership, and corporation,’ while the
term ‘entity’ is defined in § 101(15) to include ‘person, estate, trust,
governmental unit, and United States trustee.’”22 Therefore, because the
probate estate would have been serving as the “debtor” for purposes of
the chapter 7 conversion, the court did not allow conversion.23
Similarly, in In re Langley, the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of Georgia faced a situation where both joint
chapter 13 debtors passed away prior to their discharge. 24 However,
unlike Spiser, the Langley debtors’ daughter sought to either convert the
case to a chapter 7 or, in the alternative, to see the chapter 13 plan
through to completion.25 Articulating the reasoning behind the court’s
decision to opt for dismissal, as opposed to the proposed alternatives,
the court stated:
Here, further administration of the case is
not “in the best interest of the parties.”
The Debtors are deceased and thus
cannot benefit; and unsecured creditors
would not benefit under either of the
scenarios Ms. Thursby [the daughter]
proposes. On the one hand, conversion
20

In re Spiser, 232 B.R. 669, 670 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1999).

21

Id. at 672 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2010)).

22

Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(41), (15) (2010)).

23

Id.

In re Langley, No. 05-61279, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 4219, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept.
28, 2009).
24

25

Id. at *1-2.
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of the case followed by a discharge would
end payments to unsecured creditors
altogether.
On the other hand, if
payments were to continue under the
chapter 13 plan, unsecured creditors
would receive a dividend of only 10% or
a pro rata share of $3,125.16. (Chapter
13 Plan and Motion – Amended,
3/3/2006, Dkt. #17.) I decline to
speculate whether creditors’ claim may be
better satisfied from the assets of the
Debtors’ decedent estates, but I note that
Georgia probate law provides for
payment of such claims. See O.C.G.A. §§
53-4-63, 53-7-40.
While allowing the case to proceed may
be in the best interest of the Debtors’
daughter, she is not a party in this case.
Moreover, because the purpose of a
bankruptcy proceeding is to give debtors
a fresh start, and because there can be no
fresh start for the Debtors here, no
purpose would be served by allowing the
case to proceed.26
Why the Langley court declined to “speculate” whether the
probate procedure would pay any of the unsecured creditors a higher
dividend than they would receive through completion of the chapter 13
plan payments leaves the reader of this opinion with somewhat of a
quandary.27 Would it not be in the best interest of all parties involved to
continue the plan payments if there was no actual equity in the family
homestead, or the probate estate, for unsecured creditors to claim? In
that hypothetical, the unsecured creditors would receive their minor
“dividend” of the claims owed through the chapter 13 plan, but that sum
could still amount to more than what those creditors would receive
under probate law. 28 This rigid adherence to procedure, without
adequate consideration given to the practical implications or alternatives
to that procedure, illustrates a serious problem in the administration of
some chapter 13 plans.

26

Id. at *2-3.
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Id.
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Id.
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II. Further Administration

If the court decides not to dismiss a chapter 13 case, the statute
instructs that “if further administration is possible and in the best interest of
the parties, the case may proceed and be concluded in the same manner,
so far as possible, as though the death or incompetency had not
occurred.” 29 As stated in In re Perkins, “the legislative history and
Bankruptcy Rule 1016 make it very clear that a deceased Chapter 7
debtor is entitled to receive a discharge.”30 Perkins further holds that the
dismissal of the chapter 13 case on account of death “would appear to
punish a debtor for filing a Chapter 13 case and trying to repay creditors
instead of filing a Chapter 7 liquidation case.”31 However, this precedent
alone provides courts with little direction on how to proceed in the
event that they do not wish to dismiss. As such, multiple courts have
grappled with the exact meaning behind legislators’ use of the term
“further administration” and how and when to determine that “further
administration” is permissible.32
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Ohio tackled the issue of ”further administration” in depth in In re
Levy.33 The debtors in Levy, Mr. and Mrs. Levy, filed a joint chapter 13
case on January 18, 2011, and their plan continued to completion on
February 25, 2014.34 On May 3, 2011, the debtors filed their certificates
of completion of the post-petition debtor education course; however in
October of 2012 Mr. Levy died.35 After Mr. Levy’s death, Mrs. Levy
completed the plan and filed the joint domestic support obligations
(“DSO”) and § 1328(h) certificates on March 14, 2014.36 It was not until
this filing that the court learned that only one of the debtors, Mrs. Levy,
had signed both certifications.37 This situation, understandably, left the
29

FED. R. BANKR. P. 1016 (1991) (emphasis added).

30

In re Perkins, 381 B.R. 530, 536 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2007).

31

Id.

See In re Levy, No. 11-60130, 2014 WL 1323165, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 31,
2014); In re Bouton, No. 10-40989-EJC, 2013 WL 5536212, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Oct.
7, 2013); In re Quint, No. 11-04296-jw, 2012 WL 2370095, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
June 22, 2012); In re White, No. 06-60363, 2011 WL 3426166, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Ga.
May 16, 2011).
32
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In re Levy, 2014 WL 1323165, at *1.
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court in a predicament. The court illustrated its difficulty by stating that
Rule 1016 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code “contemplates completion
and discharge when possible[,] but courts often struggle to determine
what is intended by the rule.” 38 “The issue for the court is how to
harmonize the goal of concluding a case involving a deceased debtor,
and thereby allowing ‘further administration,’ while also satisfying a
debtor’s pre-discharge requirements.”39
The Levy court realized a new problem that death during a
chapter 13 bankruptcy creates: how does a court ensure that all of the
pre-discharge requirements are met? 40 After a meticulous analysis of
previous and disparate rulings from other courts, the court determined
that “the end of the case requirements are not an automatic bar to
allowing ‘further administration’ in a case involving a deceased debtor.”41
Then, the court stated that those who may act on behalf of a deceased
debtor must be decided on a case-by-case basis. 42 Defining the
parameters of “further administration,” the court ultimately held that
“the facts and circumstances of each case will drive the determination of
who [may act on behalf of a deceased debtor], whether further
administration is possible, and whether it is in the best interest of the
parties.”43 While the court concluded that there must still be an analysis
into whether the best interests of the parties are being served by any
further administration of the case without the deceased debtor,44 it also
further increased the possibility of confusion for debtors in the future.45
Based on this ruling, why could the debtors’ daughter in Langley
or the deceased debtor’s wife in Fogel not have been a proper party for
“further administration”? 46 Both instances involved individuals who
could, or in the case of Fogel did, make all plan payments, but they were
not allowed to benefit from the fruits of those labors.47 Surely a case

38

Id. (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 1016 (1991)).

39

Id.

40

In re Levy, 2014 WL 1323165, at *1.
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Id. (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 1016 (1991)).
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Id.
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Id. at *4; see also In re Perkins, 381 B.R. 530, 537.
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Id. at *4.
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Id.

See In re Langley, No. 05-61279, 2009 WL 5227665, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept. 28,
2009); In re Fogel, 507 B.R. 734, 735 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2014).
46
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In re Langley, 2009 WL 5227665, at *1; In re Fogel, 507 B.R. at 735.
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could be made that the best interests of the parties were being served by
such allowances.
According to the Levy court, the ruling in In re Bouton represented
a tacit understanding that “further administration” could encompass the
granting of discharge.48 The court stated that “[t]he result was a de facto
acceptance that ‘further administration’ can mean entry of a discharge
even if the debtor does not comply with end-of-the-case
requirements.”49 In In re Bouton, a singular chapter 13 debtor died after
completing the plan payments, but prior to filing the domestic support
obligation certification. 50 After the debtor died, her “counsel filed a
motion to exempt the debtor from the financial management course and
court’s DSO certification requirement. . . . After reviewing the record,
finding no evidence of a DSO obligation, and concluding a dead debtor
[met] the definition of disability in 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(4), the court
granted the motion.” 51 Nevertheless, a bankruptcy judge in the same
district of Georgia determined in In re White, that virtually the same
circumstances should result in a dismissal once the family, who had paid
all the plan payments, filed a notification of the debtor’s death.52 Such
inconsistent opinions—displayed not only by multiple states’ bankruptcy
courts, but also by bankruptcy judges within the same jurisdiction—
should not negatively impact debtors who have suffered the unfortunate
circumstance of losing their co-debtor during a chapter 13 plan.
III. Hardship Discharge

A third option available to courts when a chapter 13 debtor dies
is to grant a hardship discharge.53 Under bankruptcy law, the hardship
discharge is governed by statute, which states:
(b) Subject to subsection (d), at any time
after the confirmation of the plan and
after notice and a hearing, the court may
48

In re Levy, 2014 WL 1323165, at *2 (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 1016 (1991)).

49

Id.

50

In re Bouton, No. 10-40989, 2013 WL 5536212, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Oct. 7, 2013).

In re Levy, 2014 WL 1323165, at *2 (citing In re Bouton, No. 10-40989, 2013 WL
5536212, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Oct. 7, 2013)) (internal citations omitted).
51
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In re White, No. 06-60363, 2011 WL 3426166, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. May 16, 2011).

See In re Hoover, No. 09-71464, 2015 WL 1407241 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2015);
In re Dickerson, No. 10-60680, 2012 WL 734160, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 6,
2012); In re Redwine, No. 09-84032-JB, 2011 WL 1116783, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar.
8, 2011).
53
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grant a discharge to a debtor that has not
completed payments under the plan only
if –
(1) the debtor’s failure to
complete such payments is due to
circumstance for which the
debtor should not justly be held
accountable;
(2) the value, as of the effective
date of the plan, of property
actually distributed under the plan
on account of each allowed
unsecured claim is not less than
the amount that would have been
paid on such claim if the estate of
the debtor had been liquidated
under chapter 7 of this title on
such date; and
(3) modification of the plan under
section 1329 of this title is not
practicable.54
While the language in this section provides more of a roadmap
for courts to follow, varying decisions still plague debtors and creditors
alike. For example, a bankruptcy court deemed the death of a debtor
sufficient for the grant of a hardship discharge in In re Graham, where the
court stated:
[I]t is clear that the debtor cannot be held
accountable for his failure to complete
the payments required under the chapter
13 plan and modification of the plan at
this ‘late’ date is equally infeasible.
Finally, the payments which were made
to creditors totaled more than the
creditors would have received in a
chapter 7 liquidation.55

54

11 U.S.C.A. § 1328(b) (1994).

55

In re Graham, 63 B.R. 95, 96 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1986).
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Some courts have reached similar conclusions when faced with
the death of a singular debtor,56 while other courts disagree with this
course of action for various reasons.
In In re McNealy, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Ohio confronted a hardship discharge issue.57 By
the court’s estimation, after the death of the debtor/husband, the only
way to determine whether the remaining debtor/wife was entitled to a
hardship discharge was through “a variation of the best interests test.”58
The court is constrained to apply a
variation of the best interests test in
granting a hardship discharge which
requires a finding that the value of
property, as of the effective date of the
plan, of property actually distributed
under the plan to each allowed unsecured
claim at least is equal to the amount
which could have been paid on the
effective date of the plan on each such
claim had the estate been liquidated under
Chapter 7.59
Though the court did not make a formal ruling on the issue of
whether or not a hardship discharge should be granted, it did provide a
more distinct structure for navigating this determination. 60 While
detailed explanations of rulings in cases like McNealy help some debtors,
a total lack of uniformity in the manner in which courts administer these
types of cases ultimately harms debtors.
The bizarre circumstances of In re Brown do not significantly
supplement an analysis of whether or not a hardship discharge should be
granted to a remaining co-debtor upon the death of his debtor/spouse,
but they do create precedent that can damage a debtor’s claim if counsel

See In re Sales, No. 03-60861, 2006 WL 2668465, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Sept. 15,
2006) (determining that since a hardship discharge is available as a conclusion to a
chapter 13 case when death has not occurred, then it is available in a case where the
debtor is deceased).
56
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In re McNealy, 31 B.R. 932 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983).
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Id. at 935.
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Id.

60

Id.
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employs crafty lawyering.61 The United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Western District of Missouri, in in re Brown determined that the debtor
satisfied the second and third prong of the hardship discharge test. 62
Ultimately, however, the court determined that the debtor should be
held accountable for the circumstances leading to her inability to
complete her chapter 13 plan payments because she was the party who
fatally shot her co-debtor/spouse.63
In contrast, the court in In re Marshall illustrated unsound
analysis when it denied a surviving co-debtor’s motion for a hardship
discharge.64 After concluding that the joint chapter 13 case had been
severed following the death of the debtor/wife, the court addressed the
deceased debtor’s counsel’s motion for a hardship discharge.65The court
ultimately concluded that the debtor’s inability to complete her plan was
due to her failure to pay income tax liabilities in a timely fashion, thereby
creating plan payments that were too exorbitantly large for her to
manage.66 Unfortunately, the analysis of the North Carolina bankruptcy
court failed to address the debtor’s ability to convert her chapter 13 plan
to a chapter 7 plan, the amount that unsecured creditors had received in
comparison to their potential payout in a chapter 7, or the fact that the
debtor’s death prevented her from modifying the plan in such a way as
to make plan payments possible. 67 Denying the motion, without
following the three pronged analysis established by the statute simply
created precedent that can frustrate the ability of debtors and creditors
to predict the outcome of chapter 13 cases.
IV. Conclusion

Judging from the vast discrepancies presented by this sample of
cases, the confusion rendered by the death of a chapter 13 debtor alone
decries the need for reform, and at the very least greater uniformity.
When cases boasting nearly identical circumstances repeatedly result in
opposite adjudications, courts deny all parties involved in the bankruptcy
process the consistency that they deserve and prevent parties from
In re Brown, No. 07-43738-13-jwv, 2009 WL 801737, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Mar.
24, 2009).
61

62

Id.

63

Id.

In re Marshall, No. 09-11603-8-RDD, 2012 WL 1155742, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. N.C.
Apr. 5, 2012).
64

65

Id.

66

Id. at *2.

67

Id.
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having confidence in the potential outcome of their cases. The current
issues with chapter 13 cases could be improved by eliminating the
discretionary language in the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
1016.68 Forcing the courts to either allow further administration of the
chapter 13 plan or to dismiss the plan altogether would at lease provide a
degree of certainty for debtors. However, this would in no way satisfy
all parties concerned. Another option would be to draft more specific
legislation instructing courts as to who may act on behalf of a deceased
debtor in fulfilling his chapter 13 plan payments. Even if such a
directive extinguished the hope of discharge in cases like Levy, at least
the system would not appear as arbitrary and capricious as it does now.
Finally, better guidelines for bankruptcy judges, and possibly more
continuing legal education opportunities for bankruptcy attorneys on the
hardship discharge system, could standardize this area of the law.
Nevertheless, the wide breadth afforded to bankruptcy judges in
adjudicating chapter 13 cases does not guarantee uniformity.
As the system currently stands, chapter 13 debtors entering into
three to five year plans have absolutely no idea whether they will be able
to experience the benefits of bankruptcy’s discharge of debts if the most
unexpected event, death, may happen to befall their co-debtor.
Likewise, creditors – many of whom are unhappy with the bankruptcy to
begin with – cannot rely upon a dismissal and the opportunity to seek
probate assets to repay debtors’ loans in the event of death. Everyone
enters the chapter 13 system blind on this issue. Unfortunately, no
current case law restores sufficient clarity.

68

See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1016 (1991).

